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Abstract. This article describes a qualitative change in the psychology of antiterrorism through nation-
building activities. 
 
Nation-building activities brought to the Third World by the United States Government (USG) have long 
been thought to psychologically contribute to antiterrorism. As socioeconomic disparities and poverty 
would decrease, as opportunities for a better life would increase, as national identity and cohesiveness 
coalesced, and as positive attitudes towards the USG strengthened, terrorist groups would be less likely 
to form. So, too, existing terrorist groups would be less likely to find recruits for operational and support 
activities. As well, the sea of the people in which terrorists might swim would dry up--or at least provide 
less cover and less nutrition. 
 
In today's security environment of globalization, however, a political entity may present still other 
opportunities beyond the above that can be exploited by terrorists. Even if terrorist groups do not form, 
even if recruitment does not occur, and even if there is no sea in which to swim, inadequate and 
dysfunctional governance can lead to (1) porous border controls; (2) inconsistent, incompetent, and 
corrupt internal policing; (3) sieve-like and corrupt customs control; and (4) contentious, corrupt, and 
unaccountable loci of political power backed by physical force. These opportunities can facilitate the 
ingress and egress of terrorists; the maintenance of terrorist safe havens; and trafficking in money, 
weapons, drugs, people, and other commodities. The fourth opportunity also facilitates terrorist 
operations, because there is no functional and viable central authority with which representatives of the 
USG can negotiate and seek approval for antiterrorist and counterterrorist operations. Such has been 
the case in Somalia and may be the case in the Congo if the latter breaks up as a result of current 
fighting involving government forces, so-called rebels, and operational and support activities involving 
Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, and Zimbabwe. (On the other hand, the USG-sponsored apprehension of 
terrorists in Albania and bombing of terrorist training sites in Afghanistan suggests that a new 
antiterrorist/counterterrorist policy may begin to vitiate the above opportunities.) 
 
Attempts at nation-building as shaping the behaviors of governance also can be exploited by terrorist-
supported mass media. Through these media nation-building becomes a violation of sovereignty, 
political and cultural imperialism, even sacrilege. The very contact between representatives of the USG 
engaged in nation-building and residents of the host nation can be explicated to support the most 
dastardly of intentions and deeds. Host nation representatives that are being cultivated by the nation-
builders can be attacked as inauthentic, coopted, unwitting fools, and as spies. Real and apocryphal acts-
-e.g., fatal accidents, logistical miscalculations, inflated promises or expectations of nation-building--can 
be communicated as showing the "true nature" of the nation-builders that belies any sincere 
humaneness. Often, vested interests in the host country that benefit from inadequate governance will 
knowingly work with terrorist representatives against the nation-builders. 
 
Based on these phenomena, calculations of nation-building planners must encompass not only cost-
benefit analyses but the likelihood that the costs may fund consequences benefiting terrorism. In fact, 
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the nation being built may be one without boundaries and overt cohesion--one that nevertheless may 
force conflict on its own terms and significantly threaten the nation-builder's own foundations. (See 
Aaker, J.L., & Maheswaran, D. (1997). The effect of cultural orientation on persuasion. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 24, 315-328; Pratkanis, A.R., & Turner, M.E. (1996). Persuasion and democracy: 
Strategies for increasing deliberative participation and enacting social change. Journal of Social Issues, 
52, 187-205; Rosen, J., & Haaga, D.A.F. (1998). Facilitating cooperation in a social dilemma: A persuasion 
approach. Journal of Psychology, 132, 143-153; Roskos-Ewoldsen, D.R. (1997). Implicit theories of 
persuasion. Human Communication Research, 24, 31-63; Schwartz, B. (1996). Memory as a cultural 
system: Abraham Lincoln in World War II. American Sociological Review, 61, 908-927.) (Keywords: 
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